Democracy is not only a value; it’s a powerful instrument, and forgetting it can damage China
On the eve of the presidential inauguration, the US Supreme Court delivered a possibly historical verdict about the controversial social App Tik-Tok. The case was highly delicate because it was about choosing between national security or freedom of speech. The Court had a hard time settling the issue at the core of American values. National security or freedom of speech are both vital for America; one can’t live without the other. Eventually, the court decided that national security trumped freedom of speech and ordered the App’s closure if it didn’t sell its property rights. The case rests now with President Donald Trump; the fact that he may uphold the verdict proves again how hard the choice between the two in America can be.
Chinese political analyst Zheng Yongnian recently published a fascinating analysis of the consequences of Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States. [i] Zheng is quite famous in China and has worked in the United States for many years.
Zheng argues that competition with the US must be analyzed across three main areas:
- Science, technology, and the economy/trade
- Ideology
- Military-geopolitical strategy
Zheng notes a significant shift with the Joe Biden administration: Trump and his associates did not genuinely believe in democracy. Zheng quotes Trump’s view that “democracy in America is at a low ebb or even in decline,” implying that Trump would use democracy instrumentally and without conviction.
While China can compete with the US in science, technology, the economy, and military-geopolitics, democracy remains America’s undisputed advantage. This element fascinates some Chinese and could potentially provide a basis for a peaceful resolution of the friction. If China were to democratize, it would significantly alter the dynamics in the other two areas. In fact, some elements of the other two areas might even disappear with a more open and democratic China.
Zheng’s skepticism towards democracy is noteworthy because he doesn’t see a connection between democracy and the other two fields. He fails to recognize what in the West is a structural link between a free society and technological, trade, and military advancement.
Conversely, Trump’s perceived skepticism of democracy, if uncorrected, could hinder his administration’s dealings with China. From a purely perceptual standpoint, if the US strategically concedes areas where America holds an advantage, it would lose an asset. It could foster greater Chinese confidence and competitiveness in other fields.
The US and the West grew in the past two centuries thanks to a delicate chemistry where freedom was crucial. All past challenges to a free society, by fascism or communism, have also been beaten thanks to liberty. History does not guarantee future success, but offhandedly dismissing it could be foolish.
Here’s a lesson from the Pope: engage with everyone, regardless of their beliefs, without sacrificing core principles. One must not abandon one’s identity and strengths—a free system in the case of the US and the Catholic faith for the Pope.
Furthermore, Zheng criticizes the Chinese state’s undue and growing influence on the economy, a defining characteristic of the past decade. He correctly argues that if unaddressed, this could stifle technological progress, potentially leading to a losing arms race with the US, mirroring the Cold War dynamic with the USSR.
“While speeding up national defense modernization, militarization of the national economy must be avoided. The primary question that the US Cold War faction is thinking about today is: It took the US nearly half a century to drag down the Soviet Union, so how long and by what method does the US need to drag down the PRC today? The strategy of the US Cold War wing is clear: to reuse the same methods that were used against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Specifically, it is to promote the ‘two-step’ of China’s national economy, the first of which is nationalizing the economy, and the second is militarizing it. The US is delighted to see the current ‘situation’ in the PRC today in which ‘the state advances at the expense of the market,’ arguing that this will eventually lead to nationalizing the PRC national economy. Once this progresses to a certain extent, the US will enact a strategy of military competition with Beijing, contributing to militarizing its national economy.
Once Beijing does so, military modernization will be unsustainable in the long run and will eventually be dragged down by the US. The US itself has no such problem: there are no SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) in the US, so once a Sino-US arms race begins, the US will channel vast state capital into private enterprises and provide military products for the government via competition among them. Every war or arms race has, empirically, raised the US to a higher scitech level. R&D around the arms race not only raised its scitech level, but contributed to its military-civilian integration system, transforming much military tech into civilian use.
Urging civil-military integration for years, Beijing has yet to achieve good results. Given the existence of many SOEs, governments at all levels naturally direct capital to SOEs, and it is difficult for SOEs to have the same effect and competitiveness as private enterprises. In recent years, the government has also put forward the policy intention of applying civil-military integration to private enterprises, but there are not many cases of actual enactment. Significant reform is needed in this area.”
The criticism is correct, but the solution could be uneasy. To change these Chinese characteristics, Beijing should undertake the following, though both are difficult and dodgy:
- Guarantee property rights (politically risky).
- Foster a complex environment for positive collaboration between military and private companies—a highly sensitive area currently mastered effectively only by the USA. A free and open society is a crucial component of this dynamic. Both initiatives require prioritizing party objectives.
Given the challenges of achieving these goals, Zheng’s analysis suggests that China will lose a long-term arms race with the US if it doesn’t face massive changes.
At the same time, underestimating the resilience of the American political system and the power of democracy—which has fueled two centuries of global development—would be a mistake. Trump’s victory was decisive, and President Joe Biden immediately conceded it. The transition of power proceeded smoothly, demonstrating the functionality of US institutions.
The perception that American, and indeed global, democracy is in decline highlights a concerning complacency in the West towards this valuable asset. Perceptions, however inaccurate, are crucial and must be addressed. The US elections were fair, the outcome clear, Biden showed grace in defeat, and Trump displayed civility.
The US, however strangely it may appear from the outside, has found a way to continue functioning; an open society inherently allows for unexpected and surprising solutions, and reality is always stronger than ideas.
Chinese leaders might surpass their American counterparts in intelligence, humanity, or education. However, despite the shortcomings of the US, its institutions and political system are better than those of China. They provided over 200 years of almost linear growth and expansion, while the PRC doesn’t have a similar record. This is the critical factor – it’s about collective and institutional wisdom that found a historical balance. This wisdom can’t be easily exported and transplanted, but this doesn’t mean it mustn’t be carefully considered, and transplantation must be studied.
Yet, this crucial message appears to be overlooked from an American perspective. As Zheng’s essay compellingly demonstrates, this oversight could prove a grave mistake.
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[i]https://docs.google.com/document/d/1e9H3HBHb0MH5ftMwerFZRTt0HLOoCA1Bd7lIRUQx_vw/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.p506qubo3ys3 in a brilliant translation by David Kelly. Zheng Yongnian, ‘How is China to deal with Trump?’, Guanchazhe, 2 January 2024 [郑永年, ‘中国如何与特朗普打交道?’, 观察者 (in Chinese).—Translation (machine-assisted, reference-quality) © David Kelly 2025).
