The Ukrainian war seeps into the faith of non-Russian countries as Moscow’s orthodoxy is feared as a trojan horse of Putin’s disruptive intentions
On February 19, the Estonian Parliament approved in its first reading a law aimed at preventing the use of the pro-Russian Church for anti-state purposes. The law establishes the illegality of a religious presence with ties of subjugation to the Moscow Patriarchate, which has already been condemned as a systemic part of Russia’s war efforts. Following the first reading, there will be two more votes, after which the law will be promulgated by the President of the Republic.
The bill, supported by the Minister of the Interior (Lauri Läänemets) and the government, passed with 41 votes in favor and 11 against. The legislation allows for the continuity of the Orthodox Church linked to the Russian Patriarchate, provided it achieves complete autonomy from Moscow, severing all canonical ties (cf. https://www.settimananews.it/informazione-internazionale/estonia-ortodossia-russa-legge/ ).
Breaking Free from Moscow
The pro-Russian Church represents 16% of Estonia’s 1.3 million inhabitants and has been under pressure since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the ideological support provided by Moscow Patriarch Kirill. However, the ethnic Russian population makes up 25% of the country.
Estonia, like Lithuania and Latvia, lives in fear of Putin’s military aggression, as he has explicitly expressed interest in rebuilding the Soviet empire to protect Russia from external military interventions, particularly from NATO.
Government concerns have further escalated following statements by U.S. President Trump in favor of Putin and against Zelensky’s Ukraine.
The pro-Russian Church is led by Metropolitan Eugene, who was expelled from the country for supporting Putin’s military intervention. He now resides in Moscow but remains the head of the synod and the administrative council. For this reason, the government has raised doubts about the legality of the church assembly held in August 2024 and the subsequent one (January 10, 2025).
These doubts were dismissed by the acting bishop, Auxiliary Bishop Daniel, who defended the decision—suggested by the government—to change the name of the Church. Initially, it was proposed as the “Orthodox Church of Estonia,” but this was rejected by the administration because it coincided with the name of the other Orthodox Church in the country, which is under the Constantinople Patriarchate. The name was then changed to “Christian Orthodox Church of Estonia,” but this was also rejected by the relevant court, as it could be interpreted as claiming to represent all Orthodox faithful in the country.
Both the synod and Bishop Daniel have complained about rising rents for churches and offices, reduced state subsidies, and media attacks.
The Pollution of Faith
The conflict centers on the law, which has raised concerns not only among Orthodox Churches linked to Moscow but also in the West and among some local legal experts.
Does intervening in a canonical relationship respect religious freedom? According to the bill’s sponsor, Andre Hanimägi, the law does not infringe on the right to freedom of conscience, nor does it aim to ban a religion or restrict celebrations. The legislator has a duty to ensure state security against the risks of hostile states or organizations using religious communities against Estonia.
Bishop Daniel holds a different view: “Throughout history, various local Churches have been led by people who supported false doctrines, but even then, the Churches did not transfer to another ecclesiastical jurisdiction. We do not support Patriarch Kirill’s position (on the war in Ukraine), nor are we obliged to do so. We have our own position.”
An official statement on January 23, stated: “Although the government justifies the legal changes in the name of national security, this is still a direct interference in religious freedom that could significantly restrict the activities of our Church in Estonia.” The pro-Russian Church has categorically ruled out any possibility of merging with the Orthodox Church linked to Constantinople, even if it were granted broad autonomy.
After Ukraine and Estonia, Will Moldova Be Next?
Parallel to the diocesan issue is the situation of the Pükhtitsa Convent. The nuns do not intend to give up their special relationship with the Moscow Patriarch.
In an open letter to the parliament and ministers, the abbess of the convent, Mother Filareta Kalachova, wrote: “Without a doubt, you understand that by adopting this bill, you are placing the convent in an illegal position. You are giving us only two options: either change jurisdiction or face forced liquidation. You understand well that this means effectively closing the convent […] and dragging us literally into a political conflict, accusing us of refusing to engage in dialogue.”
This situation closely resembles the similar conflict in Ukraine between the autocephalous Church and the Church linked to Russia. There are voices suggesting that a third, similar scenario could emerge, this time in Moldova, where the local Orthodox Church is divided between allegiance to Moscow and allegiance to Romania.
The pro-Western government supports the Romanian presence, which aligns with the tradition of a large part of the population. Pro-Russian factions accuse the Romanian Orthodox Church of violating their canonical territory. This highlights the devastating ambiguity of Patriarch Kirill’s war choices and the difficult management of the relationship between Orthodox Churches and their nations.
