A truce is necessary even to begin understanding Russia’s brinkmanship, as Moscow has reawakened the long-dormant monster of European militarism.
Germany plans to build anti-raid shelters, France is considering sending troops, and Poland has tripled its military expenditures. Even sleepy Italy is contemplating a modest rearmament program. Russian President Vladimir Putin is walking on thin ice. The longer the war in Ukraine continues, the more Europeans believe they need to become actively involved. So what would Russia do? Confront a massively overwhelming pan-European coalition or start a nuclear war over the Donbas, a place that has already caused around 700,000 Russian casualties?
Putin is achieving a feat that seemed impossible only a couple of years ago: he is re-awakening European militarism, which had been buried for 80 years. European bellicosity, notorious for driving the past 500-600 years of Western global expansion, reshaped world history with unforeseen consequences. The merciless slaughter of two world wars and the threat of total nuclear annihilation during the Cold War were what halted it.
The events of the past century managed, for the first time in history, to scare Europeans away from their belligerent inclinations. Now, Putin is reawakening this sleeping ogre after over two years of constant provocations and escalations, combined with the menace of waning American support for Ukraine, as voiced by US president-elect Donald Trump.
The last straw was Russia’s use of a new medium-range ballistic missile, “Oreshnik,” to strike the Ukrainian city of Dnipro. It came after the deployment of over 10,000 North Korean troops and was followed by the announcement that hundreds of Houthi warriors would be flown in from Yemen to the Donbas. The ballistic missile signals the possibility of nuclear escalation.
Putin has been gambling for over two years, believing that the West Europeans, long reluctant supporters of the war, would cave. Perhaps he has reached the limit. His recent threat of nuclear war is empty. Were he to start it, he would lose everything, and Moscow would be wiped off the map. But, by consistently escalating, he has driven the Europeans into a corner with their much-neglected rearmament.
Two Scenarios
Here are two scenarios: one short-term about Russia and one long-term about Europe and the world.
No old European power wants to risk Russia’s obliteration. It would open a terrifying, gigantic vacuum in the middle of the Eurasian continent. It’s not a panic about a Russian reaction. This has logical consequences. Some truce must be found, but Putin must stop his gambling. The EU is hearing a general wake-up call. War is at the gates, and with or without Ukrainian peace, the old continent should prepare again to take up arms.
In the long term, there’s a profound consequence of Putin’s recent nuclear “brinkmanship.” It is very different from the Cold War’s brinkmanship.
Then, there was a general, shared agreement on red lines, agreed upon in the 1945 Yalta Conference when the powers were only three (Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union) and were still allies in a common war against the fascist powers. The three knew their differences but had established mutual trust during the conflict. Moreover, all were paying a huge price for the struggle and didn’t want to repeat or extend it.
Cold War 1 brinkmanship was about getting close to a “red line” that everyone had agreed upon: push it but not cross it. The red lines, the push and counter-pushes, the deep mutual understanding and “trust” in each other, and the basic reluctance for a global war held the brinkmanship together. The communication grammar of that brinkmanship was clear.
Now, nobody has agreed on anything. Putin’s Russia emerged from decades of feeling betrayed by the US and NATO. There is no trust between Russia and the United States. The European countries think Russia has duped them with the war. They do not want a war, but neither are they ready to split the world with Moscow along lines they fear will be crossed at any convenient moment. There is incredulity about possible red lines, no common experience in a war, and possibly even a more negligible reluctance to enter a new, larger conflict.
Therefore, the grammar of the current brinkmanship is unclear, and thus, nobody understands what Putin wants, so one must assume the worst. To return to a possibly reasonable backdrop, the following questions should be satisfactorily answered: Does Putin propose a new Yalta? Who should be in, and who should be out of it? Is China in or out? It’s problematic if it’s in; it’s problematic if it’s out. Without a Yalta-type conference setting areas of influence and red lines, there can’t be an understandable, and thus effective, brinkmanship.
We know that Putin is bent on re-establishing a neo-czarist empire. It may be understandable, but what are the limits of this empire, and are other countries willing to accept them? If they don’t accept them, must they undergo attacks and subversion by Russia? What is Putin’s long-term goal? Expansion for expansion’s sake, or is there a limit? If there’s a limit, are other countries, even friendly ones like China or Iran, ready to believe in it?
It’s impossible to respond convincingly to these questions without basic agreement. Then, a pause is necessary for Russia more than for anybody, even if it wants to pursue its imperial dreams and brinkmanship. A threat is only effective if it is understood. If it isn’t, it defeats the purpose and confuses everybody.
Trump says he wants to talk and find an agreement. It is the right time to stop the fight and try to understand each other.
